Public procurement evidence · reviewed 4 September 2026
Sealkeep release provenance and SBOM status
This page states the release evidence Sealkeep can show today and the controls it does not yet claim. It is not a software-signing or supply-chain certification.
Available today
package-lock.jsonrecords the resolved npm dependency graph and integrity fields.- The package declares supported runtime and platform constraints.
- The build runs from TypeScript source and the release process can be tied to a named
source revision.
- Release tooling computes a SHA-256 digest and byte size for a packed artifact.
- Release tooling emits an explicitly unsigned manifest when no signing key is
supplied; it does not silently make an unsigned artifact appear signed.
- When a deliberately supplied release key is available, the manifest format supports
an Ed25519 signature and key identifier.
- Automated tests cover cryptographic tampering, restore integrity, queue durability,
upload verification, tenant boundaries, device auth, and company collaboration.
Evidence expected with an enterprise delivery
| Evidence | Current status |
|---|---|
| Product name, semantic version, build timestamp | Available in package/build metadata |
| Source revision | Record for the delivered build |
| Artifact filename, byte size, SHA-256 | Supported by release tooling |
| Dependency lockfile | Available |
| Machine-readable SBOM (CycloneDX or SPDX) | Planned for public per-release publication |
| Signed release manifest and published verification key | Supported by tooling; public release operation and key policy remain to establish |
| OS code-signing/notarisation | Not currently claimed |
| Reproducible-build proof | Not currently claimed |
| Vulnerability scan summary and disposition | Process and public artifact remain to establish |
| Build-system attestation (for example SLSA provenance) | Not currently claimed |
Acceptance rule
A buyer should treat only the evidence supplied for the exact delivered artifact as release provenance. A source lockfile, test run, checksum, signed manifest, SBOM, OS signature, and independent assessment answer different questions and must not be presented as interchangeable.
Planned public release bundle
- Versioned artifact and SHA-256 checksums.
- Source revision and build-environment identity.
- CycloneDX or SPDX SBOM generated from the shipped dependency graph.
- Signed manifest plus published verification procedure and key-rotation policy.
- Test and vulnerability-scan summary with unresolved findings stated.
- Platform signing/notarisation evidence when certificates are operational.
Supply-chain questions: security@spala.ai